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Abstract
The Law of the Sea Committee (“LOS Committee” or “Committee”) of the International Law
Association’s American Branch (“ABILA”) will complete its project, Terms in the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea or in Convention Analysis that the Convention Does Not Define
(“Report”), in 2009. If the U.S. Senate gives advice and consent, and President Barack Obama
exchanges ratifications, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “Convention”)
and its 1994 protocol will, belatedly in the view of many, become law for the United States, as they
already are for much of the world. It is hoped that this group project, like those in which Professor
Joseph C. Sweeney has participated, will contribute to a better world governed by the rule of law.
Part I gives a short history of the movement from custom and other sources international law to
treaty law affecting ocean space. Part II discusses the 1958 and 1982 law of the sea conventions.
Part III traces the history of the definitions project and offers observations on the utility of the
project, whether the United States becomes a Convention partner or not.
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INTRODUCTION
The Law of the Sea Committee ("LOS Committee" or
"Committee") of the International Law Association's American
Branch ("ABILA") will complete its project, Terms in the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea or in Convention Analysis that
the Convention Does Not Define ("Report"), in 2009.1 If the U.S.
Senate gives advice and consent, and President Barack Obama
exchanges ratifications, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea ("UNCLOS" or "Convention") and its 1994 protocol 2 will,
belatedly in the view of many,' become law for the United States,
as they already are for much of the world.4 It is hoped that this
group project, like those in which Professor Joseph C. Sweeney
has participated,5 will contribute to a better world governed by
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.A., University of Ala-
bama, 1959; LL.B., Vanderbilt University, 1966; A.M., Duke University, 1968; LL.M.,
University of Virginia, 1972. Member, Virginia and North Carolina bars. My thanks to
the Fordham International Law Journal for inviting me to join colleagues and friends to
honor my longtime colleague and friend, Joseph C. Sweeney.
1. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
2007-2008, at 46-367 (Jeffery Atik ed., 2008), reprinted in part in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION (AMERICAN BRANCH) LAW OF THE SEA COMMIrrTEE, TERMS IN THE 1982 U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OR IN CONVENTION ANALYSIS THAT THE CONVEN-
TION DOES NOT DEFINE (2008) [hereinafter REPORT].
2. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S 3, 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]; Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part II of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994,
1836 U.N.T.S. 3, 42 [hereinafter Agreement].
3. A panel discussion I chaired, "Implications of U.S. Acceptance of the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention," on October 18, 2008 at the American Branch of the Interna-
tional Law Association annual meeting in New York City was unanimously of this view.
4. As of January 17, 2009, 157 States were party to U.N. Convention on the Law of
Sea ("UNCLOS"), supra note 2; 135 were party to the Agreement, supra note 2. United
Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Section, United Nations Treaty Collection, Mul-
tilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, available at http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
5. Professor Sweeney was U.S. Representative and Chair of Delegation to the
Hamburg, Germany diplomatic conference that produced the U.N. Convention on Car-
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the rule of law.
Part I gives a short history of the movement from custom
and other sources international law to treaty law affecting ocean
space. Part II discusses the 19586 and 1982 law of the sea con-
ventions. Part III traces the history of the definitions project and
offers observations on the utility of the project, whether the
United States becomes a Convention partner or not.7
I. FROM CUSTOM AND OTHER SOURCES TO TREATY LAW
FOR THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE OCEANS
When Professor Sweeney began law practice in the late Fif-
ties, sources for the legal order governing the sea in peace and
war was a mix of customary law, general principles, court deci-
sions, and publications of researchers.8 Treaties as a primary
source of law, perhaps reacting to rules established through
riage of Goods by Sea. See U.N. Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978,
1695 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Hamburg Rules]. Professor Sweeney was also U.S. Alter-
nate Representative to the Vienna, Austria Conference that produced the U.N. Conven-
tion on Liability of Terminal Operators in International Trade. See U.N. Convention
on Liability of Terminal Operators in International Trade, Apr. 19, 1991, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF/152/13 (1991) [hereinafter Terminal Operators Convention] (not in force).
The United States signed both but is not a party to either.
6. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention]; Convention on
the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 478, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Con-
tinental Shelf Convention]; Convention on Fishing & Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter
Fishing Convention]; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention].
7. Consistent with the nonpartisan position of the International Law Association
(American Branch), and the author's chairing its Law of the Sea Committee, I take no
view on whether the United States should become an UNCLOS party. However,
George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980-1988. Law and Policy, 74 U.S. NAVAL WAR C.
STUD. 1, 163-4 (2000) advocated U.S. ratification. The U.S. Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations has twice recommended advice and consent. See generally S. EXEC. REP.
No. 110-9 (2007) (Convention on the Law of the Sea) (110th Cong., 1st Sess.); S. Exec.
Rep. No. 108-10 (2004) (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) (108th
Cong., 2d Sess.). When Congress adjourned in 2008, UNCLOS returned to Committee
jurisdiction for possible reporting out in 2009 or later. Standing Rules of the Senate, S.
Doc. No. 106-15, Rule 30(1) (2000).
8. Compare Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 38(1), 59, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute] (listing primary, secondary sources of
international law, declaring that International Court of Justice decisions are not prece-
dent beyond the parties, issues involved in a particular case), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 102-03 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter RESTATEMENT [THIRD]]. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1, cmt. c (1965); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
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other sources, 9 to confirm customary rules, ° or as a reaction to
events (some tragic in terms of loss of human life)11 and others
to decimation of wildlife,'12 destruction of the ocean environ-
ment through pollution,1 3 improvement of the legal regime for
ocean trade, 14 or the need for international navigational rules'"
TIONAL LAw ch. 1 (6th ed. 2003); ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATrS, OPPENHEIM'S IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW §§ 8-17 (9th ed. 1996).
9. See, e.g., International Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation, May 10,
1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 233, declaring that only flag state jurisdiction existed for those ac-
cused of crime on the high seas, superseding to that extent The Case of S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25, which had held that the state whose victims
were aboard a vessel flying that state's flag, could prosecute an accused. UNCLOS, supra
note 2, art. 94(1), declares that penal proceedings may only be instituted before courts
of the flag state or of the state of the accused's nationality.
10. See, e.g., Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions on the Exercise of the
Right of Capture in Maritime War (Hague XI) art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396 [here-
inafter Hague XI] (confirming the holding of The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-
714 (1900), which had accepted a customary rule that small coastal fishing vessels were
immune from seizure if they were not contributing to an enemy's war effort).
11. See, e.g., International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, Jan. 20, 1914, 219
Consol. T.S. 177 (reacting to loss of R.M.S. Titanic); see also Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718, 730 (1914); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 951
(4th Cir. 1999). The Convention's successor is the International Convention for Safety
of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2, 278, for which there are
many amendments, including Protocol of 1978 Relating to International Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea, Feb. 17, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 5577, 1226 U.N.T.S. 237. See generally
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON JANUARY 1,
2007, at 400-01, 405-06 (2007) [hereinafter TIF]; CHRISTIAN L. WIKTOR, MULTILATERAL
TREATY CALENDAR 1648-1995, at 1041-42, 1128 (1998).
12. See, e.g., treaties related to whaling, which by the early twentieth century had
hunted some of these leviathans close to extinction. See generally Convention for Regula-
tion of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 349 (still in force but modi-
fied by later treaties and schedules); see also TIF, supra note 11, at 470-71. The whaling
issue remains alive today.
13. See, e.g, International Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, superseded by International Conven-
tion for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184, and Proto-
col of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships of November 2, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, the latter two in force
today. There have been many modifications. See WIKTOR, supra note 11, at 1127-28; TIF,
supra note 11, at 396-97.
14. See generally Hamburg Rules, supra note 5; Terminal Operators Convention,
supra note 5 (for which Professor Sweeney was the U.S. Representative).
15. The first multilateral agreement to go into force was Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Respecting Collisions Between Vessels, Sept. 23, 1910, 212 Con-
sol. T.S. 178. The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Colli-
sions at Sea, 1972, with International Regulations ("COLREGS"), Oct. 20, 1972, 28
U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, as modified by amendments to the Regulations, re-
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operated (and continue to operate) in specialized areas. How-
ever, there was no general, overarching treaty establishing gen-
eral peacetime legal order standards for over two-thirds of the
Earth's surface.16 Several treaties regulated, and continue to
regulate, humanitarian principles, certain aspects of naval war-
fare, and maritime neutrality during war at sea.
17
States also relied on national laws that could affect or claim
to affect wide areas of the ocean well beyond the territorial sea,
the border of which was then almost universally set at three miles
off their coasts."i Other states established flag of convenience
regimes that left a legal muddle for regulating private order-
ings.1 9
placed International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, June 17, 1960, 16
U.S.T. 794, which superseded International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, June 10, 1948, 4 U.S.T. 2956, 191 U.N.T.S. 20. See also TIF, supra note 11, at 403-
04, noting that a few states are not parties to the 1972 treaty.
16. The Convention on Civil Aviation arts. 1-2, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, which declared the airspace above a state's territorial sea as part of that
state's sovereign territory, was an exception. This dovetails with UNCLOS, supra note 2,
art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.
17. The most important today is Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (Second Convention), replacing Convention for
the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention
(Hague X), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, in force as the humanitarian law standard
during World Wars I and II. Other treaties include Convention Relating to Status of
Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities (Hague VI), Oct. 18, 1907, 205
Consol. T.S. 305, never in force for the United States; Convention Relating to Conver-
sion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships (Hague VII), Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S.
319, also never in force for the United States; Convention Relative to Laying of Auto-
matic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague VIII), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332; Conven-
tion Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX), Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2351; Hague XI, supra note 10; Convention Concerning the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415; Con-
vention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989; Procs-Verbal Relating to
Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April
1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 3 Bevans 298, 173 L.N.T.S. 353.
18. See, e.g., the Truman proclamations claiming sovereignty of the continental
shelf off U.S. coasts and a less well known claim for a fishing zone. Policy of the United
States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Conti-
nental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945), 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48);
Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the
High Seas, Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48). Other
countries followed suit, sometimes expanding the claim to include a territorial sea out-
ward hundreds of miles from their coasts. See Walker, supra note 7, at 249-52, 2'60-62.
But see Convention on Civil Aviation, supra note 16, art. I (declaring the rule for air-
space above the territorial sea).
19. See generally BOLESLAw A. BOCZEK, FLAGs OF CONVENIENCE: Ai INTERNATIONAL
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International organizations, whether nongovernmental
("NGOs") 21 or intergovernmental ("IGOs"),21 operated within
their charter parameters but made important contributions.
There were also issues of the relationship among the law of
peacetime oceans use, the rules during naval warfare,22 and rules
for neutrality and belligerent use of the oceans.23 The first half
LEGAL STUDY (1962); ROBERT CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1981).
20. Two nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") that are quite active today are
the Comite Maritime Internationale, headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, which with its
national affiliates like the U.S. Maritime Law Association, has promoted treaties like the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lad-
ing for Carriage of Goods by Sea, Aug. 25, 1934, 51 Star. 233, 120 L.N.T.S. 155, imple-
mented for the United States today by 46 U.S.C. §§ 30701-16 (2009), and the Interna-
tional Law Association, headquartered in London, which has published rules affecting
oceans law. See, e.g., Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, in INT'L L. AsS'N,
REPORT OF THE 68TH CONFERENCE, TAIPEI, 1998, at 496 (1998). The International Law
Association more recently has debated standards for the outer continental shelf. A
third is the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, sited in San Remo, Italy, which
has published the San Remo Manual. See INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS AND NAVAL EXPERTS
CONVENED BY THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck
ed., 1995) [hereinafter San Remo Manual].
21. Two intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs") with a history of developing
rules affecting the legal order of the oceans are the International Labor Organization
("ILO"), governed by Instrument for Amendment of the International Labor Organiza-
tion, Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Star. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, and the International Maritime Organ-
ization ("IMO") formerly the International Maritime Consultative Organization
("IMCO"), chartered under Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. The ILO predates the United Nations;
IMCO/IMO was organized under U.N. auspices as a specialized agency. The ILO spon-
sors treaties dealing with working conditions for mariners, e.g., Convention Concern-
ing Minimum Requirement of Professional Capacity for Masters & Officers on Board
Merchant Ships, Oct. 24, 1936, 54 Stat. 1683, 40 U.N.T.S. 153; Convention Concerning
Liability of the Shipowner in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen, Oct. 24,
1936, 54 Stat. 1693, 40 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter Shipowner Liability Convention];
Convention Fixing Minimum Age for Admission of Children to Employment at Sea, 54
Stat. 1705, 40 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention Concerning Certification of Able Seamen, June
29, 1946, 5 U.S.T. 605, 94 U.N.T.S. 11. IMO is responsible for promoting agreements
governing safety at sea, e.g., COLREGS, supra note 15. Some NGOs whose work affects
oceans law have become IGOs, e.g., the International Hydrographic Organization, May
3, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1857, 751 U.N.T.S. 41, first informally established in 1919 as the
International Hydrographic Bureau. WIKTOR, supra note 11, at 205, 848.
22. Most of today's law of naval warfare relies on customary law and general princi-
ples standards, although there are early treaties, many of which are in desuetude or
which cover obsolete methods of sea warfare. A major exception is humanitarian law,
exemplified by the Second Convention. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. Most of today's law of maritime neutrality relies on customary law and general
principles standards, although there are early treaties, still in force, but which are obso-
lete in some respects. See supra notes 17 and accompanying text.
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of the Twentieth Century had experienced two conflicts involv-
ing all of the Earth, the Great War and World War II where there
were few neutrals operating on the high seas. After 1945 and the
beginning of the U.S.-USSR Cold War deadlock (1947-91), the
prospect of issues involving small wars, including civil wars, and
neutral rights remained.
There were also private sector ordering problems, i.e., in
admiralty and maritime law. Even with respect to the latter there
was intersection between private international law and public in-
ternational law, 4 e.g., with respect to governmental actions in-
volving shipping (e.g., the act of state doctrine),2" immunity of
government owned or operated ships,26 and standards for seafar-
ers' working conditions and the like, on the sea.17 A further
problem was acceptance of international law standards as rules
for national law.28 Many of these issues beset us today.29
24. The U.S. Congress recognized the jurisdictional relationship in the statute con-
ferring exclusive admiralty jurisdiction on the U.S. District Courts. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) (2006). The statute also gives them exclusive prize case jurisdiction, an as-
pect of naval warfare and neutrality. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (2006).
25. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-24 (1964),
today displaced in part by 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (2006), a case that wound through
the federal courts and straddled the Cuban Missile Crisis and the most serious risk of
nuclear conflict during the Cold War. See generally ABRAM CIAYEs, THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS (1974); ROBERT A. DIVINE, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971); ROBERT F. KEN-
NEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1969).
26. As to government-owned or operated foreign flag merchantmen, the United
States observed the absolute theory of sovereign immunity until the 1952 Tate Letter.
See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, 25 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) and
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a) (4), 1391 (f),
1441(d), 1602-11 (2006), which aligned the United States with most of the rest of the
world with the restrictive theory, where, with exceptions (e.g., terrorist activity) State-
owned foreign flag merchantmen engaged in typical commercial activity are subject to
litigation and liability like those owned or operated by private companies. See UNCLOS,
supra note 2, arts. 42(5), 95, 96, 110(1), 236, declares rules for immunity of government
aircraft, government operated ships, and warships.
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for ILO's influence around the world.
Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 525-29 (1951) held U.S. law applied a better stan-
dard of relief for mariners than general customary law and that the Shipowner Liability
Convention, supra note 21, brought the world up to U.S. law.
28. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), whose principles for
receiving custom into U.S. law, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004), re-
peated.
29. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734 n.12, is an example. Sosa declined to accept Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/217 (Dec. 8, 1948), as part of
U.S. customary international law because the then U.S. U.N. Permanent Representa-
tive, Eleanor Roosevelt had declared the Declaration was not a binding standard. Filar-
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The U.N. Charter, today in force for nearly every State, has
established a new and superior regime of law for all U.N. Mem-
bers, at least with respect to treaties, and perhaps for other
sources of international law. The Charter specifically declares
that it is supreme over all international agreements.3 ° If the
U.N. Security Council passes a resolution that is a "decision,"
Member States must obey its mandate. 31 This should be distin-
guished from Council resolutions recommending or calling for
action, which by the majority view are recommendatory in na-
ture, like U.N. General Assembly resolutions. 2 However, courts
and commentators have espoused the view that these otherwise
nonmandatory resolutions can ascend into customary interna-
tional law.3 3 This was new, in terms of world order; the idea that
an international organization could establish binding standards
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) had reached the opposite conclusion.
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358-60 (2008) reached a similar conclusion for Inter-
national Court of Justice ("I.CJ.") cases, stating, however, that they were entitled to
great respect, but relying in part on I.C.J. Statute, art. 59. See I.CJ. Statute, supra note 8,
art. 59. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356-60, following Sanches-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331,
347 (2006), also held that U.N. Charter art. 94 was non-self-executing, i.e., Congress
must implement it by legislation.
30. See U.N. Charter art. 103; see also LELAND F. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 614-17 (3d & rev. ed. 1969);JENNINGS & WATrTS, supra note 8, § 592; 2
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1292-1302 (Bruno B. Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter SIMmA].
31. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48, 94(2), 103; see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 30, at
207-11, 334-37, 555-59, 614-17; 1 & 2 SIMMA, supra note 30, at 454-62, 776-80, 1174-79,
1292-1302; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 83, 87 (1993) (principles flowing from Council decisions pursuant to U.N.
Charter arts. 25, 48, 103 are treaty law binding U.N. Members and override other treaty
obligations). Article 103 does not apply to custom orjus cogens derived independently
of a treaty, however, unless Article 103 might be considered ajus cogens norm itself, and
a jus cogens norm superior to other jus cogens norms, or its principles might be consid-
ered a norm that is superior to conflicting custom. See also I.C.J. Statute, supra note 8,
art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, §§ 102-03; supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text.
32. U.N. Charter arts. 10-11, 13-14, 33, 36-37, 39-41; see also SvDNE D. BAILEY & SAM
DAws, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECUITY COUNCIL 18-21, 236-37 (3d ed. 1998);
BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 14; JORGE CASTENADA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 78-79 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 30, at 111-
29, 133-44, 257-65, 277-87, 290-314; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 8, § 16; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 8, § 103(2)(d) & r.n.2; I SIMMA, supra note 8, at 257-87, 298-326,
583-94, 616-43, 717-49.
33. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and
Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. INT'L LJ. 57, 72-73 (2007) (citing the Uniting
For Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377, 1, U.N. Doc. A.1775 (Nov. 3, 1950), employed
during the Korean War to continue U.N. operations); Legal Consequences of Construc-
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,
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for all its members to follow. Other international organizations
may have similar rules, binding or nonbinding according to
their charters, in place.
There was a second development, little noticed among all
but commentators, the growth of the concept of jus cogens, i.e.,
fundamental norms that trump international custom and trea-
ties, 3 4 analogous to the supremacy of Charter rules and Security
Council decisions.35 The debate has ensued as to what are jus
cogens norms. The Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
("Nuclear Weapons") and Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.) ("Nicaragua") cases have held that Charter Article 2(4),
prohibiting the use of force to undermine the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of a State, approaches jus cogens,
and the case has been made that Article 51, preserving the inher-
ent right to individual and collective self-defense, also has jus
cogens status."6 If other principles, e.g., human rights law stan-
148-51 (July 9); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.CJ.
151, 163-71 (July 20); see also Walker, supra note 7, at 175-77.
34. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl., arts. 53, 64, 71, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Jus cogens has uncertain
contours. See BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 5, 488-90, 597-98 (jus cogens' content uncer-
tain); T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAw OF TREATIES 177-87 (1974) (same); JENNINGS &
WAITS, supra note 8, §§ 2, 642, 653 (same); LORD McNMaR, THE LAw OF TREATIES 214-15
(1961) (same); RESTATEMENTr (THIRD), supra note 8, §§ 102 r.n. 6, 323 cmt. b, 331(2),
338(2) (same); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAw OF TREATIES 1945-1986, at
281-88 (1989); 1 SIMMA, supra note 30, at 62 (dispute over self-determination as jus
cogens); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES 17-18, 218-26
(2d ed. 1984) (Vienna Convention principles considered progressive development in
1984); GRIGORJI I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 98 (William E. Butler trans.,
1974); Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus cogens in Contemporary Law, 172 RECUEIL DES
CouRs DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (R.C.A.D.I.) 219, 262-63 (1981);John
N. Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL. 9, 25-29
(1977); Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Last Third of a Century, 159
R.C.A.D.I. 9, 64-67 (1978); see generally Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept ofJus
cogens, As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. l, rr'L L. 1 (1995). An
International Law Commission study acknowledged primacy of U.N. Charter art. 103-
based law and jus cogens but declined to catalogue what are jus cogens norms. Int'l Law
Comm'n, Report on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 10, pp. 221-
25, UN Doc. A/60/10 (2005) (ILC Rep., 2005); see also MichaelJ. Matheson, The Fifty-
Seventh Session of the International Law Commission, 100 Am. J. INT'L L. 416, 422 (2006).
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 245 [hereinaf-
ter Nuclear Weapons]; Military & Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14,
100-01 [hereinafter Nicaragua case] (U.N. Charter art. 2[4] approaches jus cogens sta-
tus); Int'l Law Comm'n, Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 50 & Commentary 1-5, at 247-49 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 ILC Rep.], reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw
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dards, whether in a treaty or a customary rule, enjoy that status,
are among the current debates on the breadth of the concept of
jus cogens.
A third issue has been the growth of "soft law," i.e., stan-
dards, perhaps coming from an international organization or a
nonbinding agreement, that deserve consideration, even though
they have not yet ascended to the status of a source of law.3 7
II. THE 1958 AND 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTIONS
It was. within this muddle (or milieu) of law, about when
Professor Sweeney began service as a U.S. Navy Judge Advo-
cate,38 that drafting and negotiations under U.N. auspices
started for the first general treaties governing the law of the sea.
Signed in 1958, the Territorial Sea Convention, Continental
Shelf Convention, Fishing Convention, and High Seas Conven-
tion have had fair ratification success among states, the Conti-
nental Shelf and High Seas Conventions attracting the most par-
ties. One significant but vague principle was introducing
"other rules" clauses in the Territorial Sea and High Seas Con-
ventions;40 the term meant that the law of the sea was subject to
the law of armed conflict ("LOAC").41 There were defects, how-
ever. The territorial sea's maximum breadth was not stated; not
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 288-89 (2002) ("fundamental substan-
tive obligations"); JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 8, § 2 (Art. 2[4] is a fundamental
norm); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, §§ 102, cmts. h, k; 905(2) & cmt. g (same);
Carin Kaghan, Jus cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L.
767, 823-27 (1997) (U.N. Charter art. 51 represents jus cogens norm). The 2001 ILC
Report, supra note 36, art. 21 & Commentary, at 177-80, reprinted in Crawford, supra, at
166, resolves the issue of conflict between U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 51 by saying
that no Art. 2(4) issues arise if there is a lawful self-defense claim. This appears to give
Article 51 the same status as Article 2(4).
37. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TRaATv LAW AND PRACTICE 52-53 (2d ed. 2007).
38. Professor Sweeney began active service as a Navy lawyer after graduation from
the Boston University Law School in 1957; he left active service in 1962 but continued
as a Navy Reservist until retiring in 1993 as a Captain.
39. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 6; Continental Shelf Convention, supra
note 6; Fishing Convention, supra note 6; High Seas Convention, supra note 6. On
January 17, 2009, Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, reported 52, 58, 38, and 63 states
parties to these treaties respectively. Most are UNCLOS parties, but these treaties gov-
ern law of the sea relations with the United States and other countries not party to
UNCLOS.
40. High Seas Convention, supra note 6, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, supra
note 6, art. 1.
41. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 302 n. 739; id. at 300-07 (noting that a broader
meaning for the phrase under UNCLOS, supra note 2, may emerge).
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many fishing rights were delimited. A 1958-60 U.N. effort to re-
solve these issues failed.4 2 There were other problems with these
treaties, e.g., no standards for claims for exclusive economic
zones ("EEZs"), no rules for waters in and around archipelagic
states, too-generalized rules for territorial sea innocent passage
and straits passage, no rules for environmental protection, no
declared limit on the outer continental shelf, and no rules for
successive treaties on the same subject or the Conventions' effect
on prior treaties. They were silent on reservations; the majority
presumption was that reservations and interpretive declarations
were permissible.43
After over a decade of drafting and negotiations, another
U.N.-sponsored treaty was signed in December 1982. UNCLOS
became effective for treaty partners in 1994 when the sixtieth
signatory ratified it.44 Because of U.S. objections to Part XI,
deep seabed mining rules for the Area,4 5 the United States did
not sign UNCLOS. However, during the William J. Clinton ad-
ministration, the United States and other countries negotiated
and signed a protocol amending UNCLOS to answer U.S. objec-
tions.4 6 President Clinton sent the treaties to the Senate, recom-
mending advice and consent, but they remained in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee until 2004, when they were re-
ported out favorably, although with many declarations and state-
ments. Congress adjourned before the Senate acted, and the
treaties returned to the Committee. They were reported out
again favorably in 2007 with the same declarations and state-
ments. They returned to the Committee when Congress ad-
journed in 2008, where they remain for possible Committee,
Senate and presidential action.47
This Article does not analyze in depth the substantive im-
provements that UNCLOS makes in the 1958 regime, noting
42. John Norton Moore, Introduction to 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY xxv (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1985) [hereinafter
1 COMMENTARY].
43. Few States interposed reservations. See generally Multilateral Treaties, supra note
4.
44. Id.
45. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 1(1) defines the Area as "the sea-bed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." See also id. arts.
133-91 (principles for Area governance); REPORT, supra note 1, at 153.
46. Agreement, supra note 2.
47. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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that UNCLOS defines the permissible outer limits of the territo-
rial sea as twelve miles,48 establishes an EEZ regime including
rules for fishing, 49 provides for archipelagic seas passage, 50 clari-
fies innocent passage rules,5 establishes straits transit passage
rules while providing for existing treaty regimes and other straits
situations,52 declares rules for the continental shelf, including
the outer shelf,53 recites rules for high seas fishing and species
conservation,54 and has marine scientific research, technology
transfer and environmental protection rules,55 among many in-
novations, amendments, and improvements.
There are other clarifications and improvements more cen-
trally related to the Definitions Project. The Convention pre-
serves the "other rules" distinction between the law of the sea
and the LOAC, with recognition that the term may have other
meanings under UNCLOS. 56 UNCLOS recognizes the relation-
ship between UNCLOS as a treaty and the Charter's prohibition
against the use of force against states' territorial integrity or po-
litical independence.57
48. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 3.
49. Id. arts. 55-75.
50. Id. arts. 46-54.
51. Id. arts. 17-32, 45.
52. Id. arts. 37-45.
53. Id. arts. 76-85.
54. Id. arts. 116-20.
55. Id. arts. 192-265.
56. Id. pmbl., art. 2(3) (territorial sea); id. arts. 19, 21, 31 (territorial sea innocent
passage); id. art. 34(2) (straits transit passage); id. art. 52(1) (archipelagic sea lanes
passage; incorporation by reference of articles 19, 21, 31); id. arts. 58(1), 58(3) (EEZ);
id. art. 78 (continental shelf; coastal State rights do not affect superjacent waters, i.e.,
territorial or high seas; coastal State cannot infringe or unjustifiably interfere with "navi-
gation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided in this Convention.");
id. art. 87(1) (high seas); id. art. 138 (the Area); id. art. 293 (court or tribunal having
jurisdiction for setting disputes must apply UNCLOS and "other rules of international
law" not incompatible with UNCLOS); id. art. 303(4) (archeological, historical objects
found at sea, "other international agreements and rules of international law regarding
the protection of objects of an archeological and historical nature."); id. annex 111,
article 21(1); see also REPORT, supra note 1, at 300-10.
57. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 103; see also UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 88, 301. Arti-
cle 88 declares that states shall use the high seas for peaceful purposes. See id. art. 88.
Article 301 requires that when states exercise rights or perform duties under the Con-
vention, they must refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, "or in any other manner inconsistent with" in-
ternational law principles embodied in the Charter. See id. art. 301. These provisions are
consonant with the Charter, art. 103, as they do not forbid legitimate military activities,
e.g., naval exercises, which are among high seas freedoms. See UNCLOS, supra note 2,
FILLING SOME OF THE GAPS
UNCLOS also lays down rules from the law of treaties to
clarify its status relative to earlier treaty regimes. The four 1958
conventions5s are superseded for states ratifying the Conven-
tion.59 If other earlier agreements are compatible with UN-
CLOS and do not affect other Convention parties' rights or obli-
gations under UNCLOS, rights and obligations under those ear-
lier treaties are not affected.6" Thus, e.g., insofar as earlier
agreements on international rules of the nautical road, i.e., In-
ternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
("COLREGS") 61 do not affect UNCLOS, they remain in full
force and effect. States may conclude agreements modifying or
suspending operation of UNCLOS' provisions, applicable only
to relations between them, provided that these agreements do
not relate to a Convention provision, and so long as this deroga-
tion is not incompatible with "the effective object and purpose
of' UNCLOS. Furthermore, these agreements must not affect
application of basic UNCLOS principles, or other states' enjoy-
ment of their rights or performance of their obligations under
it. 62 Other treaties expressly permitted or preserved by the Con-
vention remain in force; 63 thus prior agreements for straits re-
gimes remain in effect.64 Article 311(6) declares that states can-
not amend "basic principles relating to the common heritage of
[hu]mankind in Article 136[, in the provisions regulating the
Area,] and that they shall not be party to any agreement in dero-
gation of [this principle]."
art. 87(1) ("inter alia") preserves. Charter rights and duties to which Article 301 refers
includes a right of self-defense. See 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 11 87.9(I)-87.90), 88.1-88.7(d) (Myron H. Nordquist ed.,
1995) [hereinafter 3 Commentary]; 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 1 301.1-301.5 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1989). Action
pursuant to UNCLOS, supra note 2, could not purport to curtail the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense any more than it could trench on the political
independence or territorial integrity of a state. U.N. Charter arts. 51, 103.
58. See supra notes 6, 39-43 and accompanying text.
59. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 311(1).
60. Id. art. 311(2).
61. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
62. States wishing to conclude such agreements must notify state parties of their
intention to conclude these agreements and the Convention modification or suspen-
sion to which it relates. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 311(3), 311(4). There are special
rules for marine environmental protection and preservation treaties. Id. art. 237.
63. Id. art. 311(5).
64. Id. art. 35(c); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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The Convention provides for amendments to UNCLOS
65
but declares that no reservations or exceptions may be made to
the Convention unless it expressly allows them.66 On the other
hand, states signing, ratifying, or acceding to UNCLOS may
make "declarations or statements, however phrased or named,
with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of [their] laws and
regulations with the provisions of [the] Convention, provided
that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude
or to modify the legal effect of the... Convention in their appli-
cation to that State."67 The result has been a flood of statements
and declarations and examination of the rules, such as they are
under the law of treaties, for applying them.68
Thus this new "constitution for the oceans" 69 is a package
deal except insofar as UNCLOS allows modifications, amend-
ments and the like. Ongoing negotiation of agreements related
to general oceans law, which began before the 1958 Conven-
tions, continued during their time, and has been a feature of the
law of the sea since the 1982 Convention, persists to this day.7 °
Unlike the regime of the 1958 Conventions, which had no
trumping clause and which, by default of no clause prohibiting
reservations, experienced a mild run of reservations, under UN-
CLOS agreements are subject to its terms.
Questions might be asked: Where does the Definitions Pro-
ject fit into the analysis of the Convention? Is the Project re-
search product useful as UNCLOS has moved to acceptance
around the world? The short answers are that the Project will
have a useful role in applying the Convention and will also be
useful in filling gaps and in analysis of the 320 articles of the
Convention and its nine Annexes.
65. Id. arts. 312-14.
66. Id. art. 309.
67. Id. art. 310.
68. See generally George K. Walker, Professionals' Definitions and States' Interpretative
Declarations (Understandings, Statements or Declarations) for the 1982 Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 461 (2007). For a current compilation of UNCLOS state-
ments, declarations, etc., see Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4.
69. Tommy T.B. Koh, Statement: A Constitution for the Oceans, in 1 COMMENTARY,
supra note 42, at 11.
70. Professor Sweeney has been a participant in this continuum. See supra note 14
and accompanying text.
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III. THE DEFINITIONS PROJECT: GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT
AND PLACE IN UNCLOS ANALYSIS"
The Project began in early 2001 as the author began chair-
ing the Branch Law of the Sea Committee.7 2 The September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, and Penn-
sylvania came a month before the Branch Annual Meeting in the
city. Convening members could see a smoke plume still emerg-
ing from the towers site as they flew into the city. The Commit-
tee convened its first panel discussion at the meeting. The ulti-
mate result was the first round of draft definitions, which was
circulated to Committee membership, persons in private and
government sectors, and academic commentators. 73
Through the next seven years, the Committee sponsored
panel discussions and circulated more drafts, usually every year,
with new definitions, to interested persons in government,
academia, and the practicing bar.7 4 Terms already defined in
the Convention were excluded from consideration. 7' Research
included other compilations of definitions, some published by
the International Hydrographic Organization 76 or government
sources,7 7 and others by commentators.78 Persons other than
71. Part III is a partial extract of REPORT, supra note 1, pts. II.B and II.C.
72. J. Ashley Roach, of the U.S. Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser
and a longtime Committee member, suggested researching terms that UNCLOS, supra
note 2, did not define. Like all government-related participants, he contributed in his
private capacity. REPORT, supra note 1, at 73.
73. Unlike most projects of this kind, the chair served as reporter as well as head-
ing the Committee. Committee membership is and has been small; it was thought use-
ful to eliminate a step of sending drafts through a chair before distribution.
74. Occasionally Branch Annual Meeting attendees requested copies, and these
persons remain on the correspondence list for future drafts. Committee membership
changed through the years, but all active members received drafts while part of the
Committee. The drafts were also published in the biennial Branch Proceedings and in
law journals. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 53, 68-70.
75. Id. at 71-72.
76. 1 INTERNATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC ORGANIZATION, HYDROGRAPHIC DICTIONARY:
GLOSSARY OF ECDIS-REIATED TERMS; SPECIAL PUBLICATION No. 32, app. 1 (2007), availa-
ble at http://ohi.schom.fr (last visited June 1, 2008); See Glossary, in IrNrrERNATIONAL Hy-
DROGRAPHIC ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC BuREAu, TECHNICAL AsPECTS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF THE SEA - 1982, app. I (Special
Pub. No. 51, 4th ed. 2006), available at http://ohi.schom.fr/publicat/free/files/S-51_
Ed4-EN.pdf [hereinafter Glossary]; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., 73 ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, annex Al-5 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999)
(currently under revision for a new edition), reprinting in part International Hydro-
graphic Organization Technical Aspects of the Law of the Sea Working Group, Consoli-
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lawyers, e.g., oceanographers, hydrographers, geographers, and
social scientists, authored some sources. The goal was to be as
inclusive as possible, both as to persons receiving drafts and as to
sources. The goal has been to synthesize sources and produce a
workable term that might be accepted as a secondary source of
law.
When the project began, there was hope that the Conven-
tion would be reported out of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations soon, and that the results of the project would
be useful within the United States as well as abroad. Because of
9/11, that was not the case; the Congress was necessarily occu-
pied with national security and other issues. It was not until
2004 that UNCLOS emerged from the Committee; after recom-
mittal to the Committee when Congress adjourned, it emerged
again in 2007 but returned to the Committee when Congress
adjourned in 2008. 7 ' The economic crisis took center stage in
late 2008; this occupied Senate time and continues to do so to
this day. With the new presidential administration and a differ-
ent Senate membership, there is renewed hope among UN-
CLOS supporters that the Convention and its companion Agree-
ment will win advice and consent, followed by exchange of ratifi-
cations.
Whether the United States ratifies the Convention or not,
results of the Project will have impact on the law of the sea,
whether in treaty format for most of the world or in customary
international law for a few states."'
Definitions that commentators research and publish as their
dated Glossary of Technical Terms Used in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
in INTERNATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC BUREAU SPECIAL PUBLICATION No. 51, app. 1 (1989)
and UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, BASELINES 46-
62 (1989) [hereinafter Consolidated Glossary], the predecessor to Glossary, supra note 76.
78. Glossary of Technical Terns, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND
LEGAL INTERFACE 321-30 (PeterJ. Cook & Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000). Besides the
Consolidated Glossary, supra note 77, Annex 1, contains various sources. See AM. GEOLOGI-
CAL INST., DICTIONARY OF GEOLOGICAL TERMS (Robert L. Bates & Julia A. Jackson eds.,
3d ed. 1984); AM. GEOLOGICAL INST., GLOSSARY OF GEOLOGY (Julia A. Jackson ed., 4th
ed. 1997); ASS'N FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFO. & EDINBURGH UNIV., ONLINE DICTIONARY (1996,
rev. 2003), available at www.agi.org.uk/public/gis.resources/index.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2003; server failure noted June 1, 2008).
79. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
80. The United States has recognized the navigational articles of UNCLOS as cus-
tomary international law. President Ronald Reagan, United States Oceans Policy, 19
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383 (No. 10, 1983).
2009] FILLING SOME OF THE GAPS 1351
work are a secondary source of law. They can provide content to
primary sources, e.g., treaty, customary rules, general principles
of law, or other secondary sources like court or arbitral deci-
sions.8' They may be considered by analogy to subsequent prac-
tice under a treaty.8 2 If Committee definitions vary from other
secondary sources, decision makers should weigh these defini-
tions with other commentary to derive rules of law." If a pri-
mary source, e.g., a treaty definition in custom or practice under
a treaty, or in the treaty itself, recites a different definition, the
latter source(s) should have priority." This is a reason why the
81. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 8, arts. 38, 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8,
§§ 102-03; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, art. 31(3) (b) declares subsequent practice
is an interpretation principle along with other factors. See also AUST, supra note 37, at
238-41; BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 602-05; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 8, § 632, at
1274-75; McNAIR, supra note 34, at 424 (parties' relevant conduct after conclusion of
treaty has "high probative value" of parties' intention when treaty concluded); Gerald
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court ofJustice 1951-4: Treaty Inter-
pretation and Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 203, 223-25 (1957); Gerald Fitz-
maurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court ofJustice: Treaty Interpretation and
Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1951) (subsequent practice
"superior" source to determine meaning); Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 34, at 42-
43. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.
1 (1966), reprinted in 2 (1966) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/
Add. 1, at 236 (1966) notes that Vienna Convention Conference negotiators rejected a
proposed provision: "A treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the applica-
tion of the treaty establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions." See
id.; see also BROWNLE, supra note 8, at 601 (Conference rejected provision); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 325(2) & cmt. c (rule that subsequent practice can mod-
ify treaty conforms to U.S. practice); SINCLAIR, supra note 34, at 135-38 (subsequent
practice can modify treaty terms); Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on
Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 523-25 (1970).
83. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (Souter, J.,joined by Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.), cites Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900), for cautionary use of scholars' opinions, as evidence of the law where there is
no treaty or custom:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations; and as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators,
who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves pecu-
liarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of what their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the
law really is.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734 (citing Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
This is the U.S. view of the matter. Restatement (Third), supra note 8, does not mention
this aspect of Habana.
84. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 8, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8,
§§ 102-03; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Committee did not attempt to research terms for which UN-
CLOS supplies a definition.85
There is also a possibility that a parallel but contradictory
custom 8 6 or other source of law, e.g., a general principle,87 may
develop alongside UNCLOS norms. The developing custom
might be the same as, and thereby strengthen, the treaty norm.88
If in opposition, custom may weaken or dislodge a treaty norm.89
UNCLOS seeks to deflect this possibility through its preamble,
which inter alia "Affirm[s] that matters not regulated by [UN-
CLOS] continue to be governed by the rules and principles of
general international law."9 The standard view on a treaty pre-
amble's worth in interpreting the law of the agreement relates to
its object and purpose, the second pillar behind a treaty's "ordi-
nary meaning" for its terms, 91 is that the preamble must be con-
sidered along with a treaty's terms.92 There is always a possibil-
ity, however, that a custom- or general principles-based norm
might be held to totally outweigh an UNCLOS rule under tradi-
tional source-balancing principles.93 For countries that are not
UNCLOS parties, a new customary norm might be held to out-
85. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, pmbl., arts. 38, 43; AusT, supra note 37, at
260-61, 303; BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 6-15; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 8, §§ 10-11;
SINCLAIR, supra note 34, at 6, 9-10, 103-04.
87. Cf I.CJ. Statute, supra note 8, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8,
§§ 102-03; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
88. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 14, 31-38, 91-135; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 6-15;JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note
8, §§ 10-11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 102 cmt. j.
89. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
49-52 (1974). Depending on circumstances, this could cut against the Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 34, art. 31 (3) (b). See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
90. UNCLOS, supra note 2, pmbl (emphasis added). By contrast, High Seas Con-
vention, supra note 6, pmbl: "Recognize[ed] that the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea . . .adopted the following provisions as generally declaratory of
established principles of international law[J" See id. For those states still parties to this
treaty, the result is a confluence of custom and treaty rules as recited in the Convention.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 34, arts. 31 (3) (a) - (b); see also supra notes 82, 89 and
accompanying text. Once these states ratify UNCLOS, supra note 2, under Vienna Con-
vention art.1 (1), the customary rules support will be lost. The other 1958 Conventions
do not have such preamble language.
91. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, arts. 31(1) - (2).
92. AUsT, supra note 37, at 236, 424-27; BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 604-05;JENNINGS
& WrATrs, supra note 8, § 632, at 1273; McNAIR, supra note 34, at 365; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 8, § 325(1) & cmt. b; SINCLAIR, supra note 34, at 128.
93. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 8, arts. 38(1), 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8,
§§ 102-03; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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weigh an UNCLOS-based customary rule. This might be con-
trasted with a situation where UNCLOS as a treaty and UN-
CLOS-based custom face a claim of a new customary norm con-
tradicting UNCLOS and the UNCLOS-based norm.
These UNCLOS treaty-trumping provisions raise issues for
the place of Report definitions if UNCLOS or a treaty
subordinate to UNCLOS does supply a definition. Assuming
subordinate treaty compatibility, etc. with UNCLOS, a definition
ancillary to a subordinate treaty cannot operate to destroy that
compatibility. If, e.g., an authoritative decision maker (e.g., a
court or perhaps an UNCLOS institution like the Area Author-
ity) accepts a Committee definition, that definition applies to
the subordinate treaty to insure compatibility with UNCLOS.
For countries like the United States that are not yet UN-
CLOS parties but which have accepted UNCLOS provisions as
customary law,94 a Committee definition might be cited to give
content to custom. If a custom or other source contrary to UN-
CLOS develops, the Committee definition might be cited to sup-
port the contrary custom or other source, to be thrown into the
analysis, or the definition on an UNCLOS term might be em-
ployed on the other side of the analysis to support UNCLOS.95
If a treaty subordinate to UNCLOS faces a general, UNCLOS-
based but contrary custom and the proponent of a Committee
definition for that subordinate treaty's term is faced with the
general UNCLOS custom, the UNCLOS general custom should
prevail. If a treaty subordinate to UNCLOS faces a general, UN-
CLOS-based but contrary custom and a definition related to that
custom, the UNCLOS general custom should also prevail. How-
ever, given relative weight that might be accorded sources under
international law analysis,96 the opposite result is possible.
94. See generally Reagan, supra note 80. Commentators have agreed with the U.S.
view. Introduction to RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, at 3-5; THOMAS & DUNCAN,
supra note 77, 1.1; Moore, supra note 42, at xxvii; Bernard H. Oxman, International
Law and Naval and Air Operations at Sea, in 64 THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 19, 29
(Int'l L. Stud., Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991). But see R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V.
LowE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 24 (3d ed. 1999); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA 48-49 (I.A. Shearer ed., 1982). The latter, researched through 1978, may re-
flect thinking during UNCLOS' early drafting years. See Walker, supra note 7, at 306 n.3.
95. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 8, arts. 38(1), 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8,
§§ 102-03; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
96. I.C.J. Statute arts. 38(1), 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, §§ 102-03; see
also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Overarching UNCLOS and its internal trumping provisions
are U.N. Charter Article 103 and the principle of jus cogens.
Where there is a conflict between a definition in the Charter
(admittedly a rare possibility), a definition in a U.N. Security
Council decision or a jus cogens-supported definition and a com-
mentator definition, the Charter,"7 a definition in a Council de-
cision or a jus cogens9-supported definition has priority. To be
sure, commentators say jus cogens "has little relevance to the law
of the sea,"1 ° but that may change in the future. At least two
Charter provisions, Articles 2(4) and 51, have been said to ap-
proach, or to have attained, jus cogens status. 1' Disputes con-
tinue as to these provisions' content, e.g., a longstanding argu-
ment on whether individual and collective self-defense includes
anticipatory self-defense, 10 2 or whether self-defense can be in-
97. Although U.N. Charter, art. 103 declares Charter primacy over treaties and not
custom or other sources, Charter definitions should prime secondary-source definitions
like those the REPORT, supra note 1, proposes. See also supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
98. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48, 94, 103; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
100. CHURCHILL & LOwE, supra note 94, at 6.
101. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying
text. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 88, declares that states shall use the high seas for
peaceful purposes. UNCLOS, art. 301, requires that when states exercise rights or per-
form duties under the Convention, they must refrain from any threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, "or in any other
manner inconsistent with" international law principles embodied in the U.N. Charter.
These provisions are consonant with the Charter, U.N. Charter art. 103; they do not
forbid legitimate military activities, e.g., naval exercises, which are among high seas
freedoms UNCLOS Art. 87(1) ("inter alia") preserves. Charter rights and duties to
which art. 301 refers include a right of self-defense. UNCLOS could not purport to
curtail the right of individual and collective self-defense. U.N. Charter arts. 51, 103; see
also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102. United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the
Secretaiy-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 188-92 (2004) (cit-
ing WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 259-60
(1964)); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONs BEHAVE 143-45 (2d ed. 1979); Oscar Schachter,
The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1633-34 (1984) (stating that
the U.N. Charter art. 51 allows a threatened State, "according to long-established inter-
national law," to take military action "as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no
other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate." However, a state cannot
purport to act in anticipatory self-defense, not just preemptively but also "preemp-
tively." The latter cases should be brought to the U.N. Security Council for possible
action. Article 51 should not be rewritten or reinterpreted.)
This approach is in line with advocates of a right of anticipatory individual and
collective self-defense based on the Charter and customary law. ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, art. 25 & cmt. 5, in 2001 ILC Rep., supra note 36, at 194, 196, reprinted
in Crawford, supra note 36, at 178-79, recognize anticipatory self-defense under the
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necessity doctrine. See also Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 245; Military & Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94, 347 (Schwebel,J., dissenting); STANIMAR A.
ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296
(1996); D.W. BowErr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-93 (1958); 49 HANS
KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Int'l L. Stud., 1957);
TIMOTHY L.H. McCoRMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID ON
THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302 (1996); MYRES S. McDoUGAL &
FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 23241 (1961); WAL-
TER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 33-48 (1999) (real debate is
scope of anticipatory self-defense right; responses must be proportional); JENNINGS &
WATTS, supra note 8, § 127; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 152-55 (1991);JULIUS STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS
AND HUMAN HOPES 3 (1974); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF
AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (1972); Richard W. Aldrich, How Do You Know
You Are At War in the Information Age?, 35 Hous. J. INT'L L. 223, 231, 248 (2000); Louis
Rene Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, "Palestine, "and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 71, 75-77 (1992); George Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in
Peacetime. Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit, 39 NAy. WAR C. REV. 69-70 (May-June
1986); James H. Doyle, Jr., Computer Networks, Proportionality, and Military Operations, in
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT & BRIAN T. O'DONNELL, COMPUTER NETWORK AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 147, 151-54 (2002); Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force
Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 51, 68 (2001); Chris-
topher Greenwood, Remarks, Neutrality, The Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force in the
Persian Gulf War (Part I), 82 PROC. Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. 158, 160-61 (1988); David K. Lin-
nan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views, 1 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57, 65-84, 122 (1991); A.V. LOWE, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA 127-30 (Hor-
ace B. Robertson ed., 1991); James McHugh, Forcible Self-Help in International Law, 25
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 61 (1972); Rein Mullerson & David J. Scheffer, Legal Regulation of the
Use of Force, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA 93, 109-14 (Lori Fisler Damrosch et al. eds., 1995);John F. Murphy, Commentary on
Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTER-
NATIONAL ORDER 241 (1991); W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion
in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 25, 45 (1991); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Self-Defense Against
Computer Network Attack under International Law, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER 121, 140 (1991); Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View
of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19
MICH.J. INT'L L. 1051, 1071, 1080-83 (1998); Abraham D. Sofaer, Sixth Annual Waldemar
A. Solf Lecture: International Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv.
89, 95 (1989); Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in
Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern World, in LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS
ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLIcr 43, 62-80 (Alberto R. Coll et al. eds., 1995); Claude
Humphrey Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 496-99 (1952) (anticipatory self-defense permissible, as long as
principles of necessity, proportionality observed); George K. Walker, Information Warfare
and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1122-24 (2000); Ruth Wedgwood, Re-
sponding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 566 (1999).
My article, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom's Self-Defense Responses, 37 VAL. U.
L. REv. 489, 536 (2003) says preemption "seems" equivalent to anticipatory self-defense,
citing contradicting views of the day. "Seems" is not the same as saying preemption and
prevention are interchangeable, as William C. Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them": A
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voked only after an armed attack.10 Articles 2(4) and 51 are as
relevant for LOS issues as for confrontations entirely on states'
land territory. Because of Charter requirements that U.N. Mem-
bers agree to carry out their Charter obligations, 10 4 a recom-
Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preemption, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1365,
1368 n.13 (2004) wrote that I said. Anticipatory self-defense and preemption may be
the same, as Abraham D. Sofaer, Iraq and International Law, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 31, 2003, at
A10, cited in George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom's Self-Defense
Responses, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 489 536 n. 198 (2003), thought, and for which my page
proofs cited him. I also cited Richard Falk, Pre-Emptive War Flagrantly Contradicts the UN's
Legal Framework: Why International Law Matters, THE NATION, March 10, 2003, at 19, 20,
to illustrate an opposing view. The Valparaiso University Law Review editors did not in-
sert my qualifying phrase for Sofaer, "thought so," as I indicated in final page proofs.
Letter of the author to Valparaiso University Law Review Editor-in-Chief, Mar., 2003 (copy
in author file). In any event I did not say that preemption and prevention are the same.
Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom's Self-Defense Responses, supra, at 536
& n.198, tried to present differing sides of a developing issue not directly relevant to
allied and coalition operations in Afghanistan. The preemption issue will be resolved
after a time of interactive claim and counterclaim, cf Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 357-58 (1955), much as the dispute over the territorial
sea's breadth has been resolved. Jane Gilliland Dalton, The United States National Security
Strategy: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 52 NAy. L. REv. 60, 68-75 (2005) takes the view
that preemption and anticipatory self-defense are not necessarily different, but national
strategy should adhere to the anticipatory self-defense doctrine.
103. Some argue that anticipatory self-defense is unlawful in the Charter era. See
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 257-61, 275-78,
366-67 (1963); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 32
(1987); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 159-85 (3d ed. 2001);
Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 121-22 (1995) (a change in
view from Henkin, supra note 102, at 143-45, in 1979); PHILIP C.JESSUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 166-67 (1948); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 83,
171 (1979); 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 52aa, at 156 (Hersch Lauter-
pacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 126 (1974);
NATALINO RONZIrI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND
INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 4 (1985); 1 SiMMA, supra note 30, at 803-04;
Tom Farer, Law and War, in 3 CYRIL E. BLACK & RICHARD A. FALK, THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30, 36-37 (1971); Yuri M. Kolosov, Limiting the Use of Force:
Self-Defense, Terrorism, and Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER 232, 234 (1991); Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947); Rainer
Lagoni, Remarks, Neutrality, The Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force in the Persian Gulf
War (Part I), 82 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 161, 162;Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Terrorist
Attacks, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 537, 541 (1999); Robert W. Tucker, The Interpretation of War
Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951); see also Robert W. Tucker,
Reprisals and Self-Defense, 66 AM. J. IN-r'L L. 586 (1972) (states may respond only after
being attacked). Recent commentary supports an expanded view of reactive self-de-
fense to include preparations for attack. See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 130, 133 (2d ed. 2004); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense
to Terrorism, 63 U. Pirr. L. REv. 889, 894 (2002).
104. U.N. Charter arts. 2(2), 2(5); see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 30, at 40-41,
56-58; 1 SIMMA, supra note 30, at 91-101, 136-39.
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mendatory Council or General Assembly resolution 10 5 would al-
most always have primacy over a Committee definition, and cer-
tainly so if a resolution recites a jus cogens or customary norm.1" 6
On the other hand, if a resolution does not restate positive law,
it should be seriously considered along with secondary sources
like the ABILA LOS Committee research. The Report under-
scores its recognition of Charter superior norms,10 7 as does UN-
CLOS: "In exercising their rights and performing their duties
under this Convention, states parties shall refrain from any
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the principles of international law embodied in the Char-
ter. ."108 These principles for U.N. resolutions should also ap-
ply to pronouncements of other intergovernmental organiza-
tions whose resolutions apply to the law of the sea, e.g., IMO.'
0 9
If a resolution is mandatory, like Security Council decisions,
such a resolution defining a term trumps a commentary defini-
tion. If the resolution is nonmandatory but restates a customary,
treaty or general principles norm, it will also have primacy. If
105. U.N. Charter arts. 10-11, 13-14, 33, 36-37, 39-41; see also supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
107. Every definition includes this caveat in its Comment: In Law of Armed Conflict
("LOAC")-governed situations under the "other rules of international law" clauses in
UNCLOS, a different definition may apply. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 300. The same
may be the situation if the U.N. Charter supersedes UNCLOS or if jus cogens norms
apply. The exception is "other rules" clause analysis. Compare, e.g., REPORT, supra note
1, at 135 with id. at 300. This may seem a bit of overkill, but having the warning after
every definition should alert hurried researchers, e.g., in a self-defense or armed con-
flict situation, that the definitions are for the law of the sea and not necessarily for other
law, i.e., Charter-governed, law of armed conflict-governed or jus cogens-governed situa-
tions. Id. at 305-06 supplies analysis demonstrating that different rules may apply during
armed conflict.
108. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 301; see also id. art. 88; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 8, § 521, cmt. b (citing U.N. Charter art. 2(4)); UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts.
88, 301 (referring to RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 905, cmt. g; accord Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 36, 1996 I.C.J. at 244; 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 57, 87.9(I),
88.1-88.7(d); 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 57, 301.1-301.6; see, e.g., Boleslaw Boczek,
Peaceful Purposes Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 OcEAN
DEVEL. & INT'L L. 359 (1989); Helsinki Principles, supra note 20, princ. 1.2, at 499; Ber-
nard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 814 (1984); John E. Parkerson, Jr., International Legal
Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 MIL. L. REv. 67, 79-85 (1987); Frank
Russo, Jr., Targeting Theory in the Law of Naval Warfare, 30 NAV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1992); see
also REPORT, supra note 1, at 300-10 ("other rules of international law").
109. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the resolution does not do so, it should be considered along with
other secondary sources like the Report. If a definition emerges
from a nongovernmental organization ("NGO"), an NGO defini-
tion should be given weight according to principles for commen-
tators' competing claims.1 °
The Report is also sensitive to the possibility of another defi-
nition for a term in law of armed conflict situations, e.g., when
UNCLOS and the 1958 Conventions declare a separate standard
of international law through their "other rules" clauses,'' which
traditionally have meant that these law of the sea treaties are sub-
ject to the LOAC in armed conflict situations." 12 Since the
LOAC, and the law of naval warfare and the law of neutrality in
particular, rely in large part on primary sources, i.e., treaties,
custom and general principles,11 a LOAC-based definition will
have primacy over a Committee definition for UNCLOS, al-
though circumstances might call for borrowing an LOS defini-
tion. "4 Similarly, self-defense situations might also call for a dif-
ferent definition that will have primacy because of the status of
the right of individual and collective self-defense as a customary,
Charter, and perhaps jus cogens norm. 1 5 Like LOAC-governed
situations, 16 however, an LOS-based definition might be bor-
rowed. The Report does, however, note a possibility of another
meaning in LOAC situations, where it analyzes "other rules of
international law."
' 1 7
The result is a Comment for every definition that warns a re-
searcher that a definition, even if acceptable for law of the sea
110. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 40-41, 56 and accompanying text.
112. The Committee settled on a definition for "other rules of international law"
that includes a possibility that the phrase may mean law other than the LOAC, includ-
ing the law of neutrality, in some situations. See supra notes 40-41, 56, 107-08 and accom-
panying text.
113. Some of these treaties may be obsolete or in desuetude. See supra notes 17, 22-
23 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., San Remo Manual, supra note 20, 12, 34, 44, 88, 106(c) & cmts.
(applying the UNCLOS "due regard" principle in law of naval warfare situations); see
also Thomas & Duncan, supra note 77, 1 8.1.3; Walker, supra note 7, at 536-46; Horace
B. Robertson, Jr., The "New" Law of the Sea and the Law of Naval Warfare, in READINGS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW ch. 19 (John Norton Moore
& Robert F. Turner eds., 1995). For analysis of and definitions for "due regard" in
UNCLOS, see REPORT, supra note 1, at 220-28.
115. U.N. Charter arts. 51, 103; see also note 57 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 40-41, 56, 107-08 and accompanying text.
117. REPORT, supra note 1, at 300-10.
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situations, may not apply where the Charter, jus cogens or the law
of armed conflict supplies rules for a situation.11
As noted earlier, with respect to terms defined in UNCLOS
itself, the Committee chose to minimize those kinds of conflicts
by declining to redefine these terms.119
CONCLUSION
The Project should close in 2009, at least for the first round
of terms proposed as definitions for UNCLOS. It is hoped that it
will be published in a widely available source, perhaps on line as
well as in print. Undoubtedly there will be future editions; new
terms have already been suggested for analysis in a supplement,
perhaps leading to a second edition. Terms already in publica-
tion may change in meaning through practice accepted as law by
States, as interpretations of treaties, whether UNCLOS or agree-
ments subordinate to UNCLOS, or through application of gen-
eral principles. As James Russell Lowell wrote over a century
ago, new occasions teach new duties; new truth makes ancient
good uncouth.1 20 So may well it be with the law of the sea, as
unchanging and yet changing as the oceans themselves.
Professor Sweeney, among many, has been at a laboring oar
in this course of change in the law of the sea. May he continue to
serve on board with us as its principles are charted in the twenty-
first century. My personal congratulations on his anniversary and
my thanks to him for his friendship and his many contributions
to the rule of law.
118. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 75, 85 and accompanying text.
120. James Russell Lowell, The Present Crisis, in I JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, POETICAL
WoRKs 185, 190 (1890).
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